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An interesting article definitely worth reading.
Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory
Hugo Mercier
University of Pennsylvania
Dan Sperber
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 57-74, 2011
Abstract:
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090
Hugo Mercier
University of Pennsylvania
Dan Sperber
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 57-74, 2011
Abstract:
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090
Does Making Choice Salient for Jurors Cause Them to Think About Personal Responsibilty?
The Unanticipated Interpersonal and Societal Consequences of Choice Victim Blaming and Reduced Support for the Public Good
Krishna Savani1⇓,
Nicole M. Stephens2 and
Hazel Rose Markus3
+ Author Affiliations
1Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
2Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
3Department of Psychology, Stanford University
Krishna Savani, Management Division, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, Uris Hall, New York, NY 10027 E-mail: ks2884@columbia.edu
Abstract
Choice makes North Americans feel more in control, free, and independent, and thus has many positive consequences for individuals’ motivation and well-being. We report five studies that uncovered novel consequences of choice for public policy and interpersonal judgments. Studies 1 through 3 found that activating the concept of choice decreases support for policies promoting intergroup equality (e.g., affirmative action) and societal benefits (e.g., reducing environmental pollution), but increases support for policies promoting individual rights (e.g., legalizing drugs). Studies 4 and 5 found that activating the concept of choice increases victim blaming and decreases empathy for disadvantaged people. Study 5 found that choice does not decrease Indians’ empathy for disadvantaged individuals, indicating that the social and interpersonal consequences of choice are likely culture-specific. This research suggests that the well-known positive effects of choice for individuals can be accompanied by an array of previously unexamined and potentially negative outcomes for other people and for society.
Published May 13, 2011
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/05/11/0956797611407928.abstract
Krishna Savani1⇓,
Nicole M. Stephens2 and
Hazel Rose Markus3
+ Author Affiliations
1Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
2Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
3Department of Psychology, Stanford University
Krishna Savani, Management Division, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, Uris Hall, New York, NY 10027 E-mail: ks2884@columbia.edu
Abstract
Choice makes North Americans feel more in control, free, and independent, and thus has many positive consequences for individuals’ motivation and well-being. We report five studies that uncovered novel consequences of choice for public policy and interpersonal judgments. Studies 1 through 3 found that activating the concept of choice decreases support for policies promoting intergroup equality (e.g., affirmative action) and societal benefits (e.g., reducing environmental pollution), but increases support for policies promoting individual rights (e.g., legalizing drugs). Studies 4 and 5 found that activating the concept of choice increases victim blaming and decreases empathy for disadvantaged people. Study 5 found that choice does not decrease Indians’ empathy for disadvantaged individuals, indicating that the social and interpersonal consequences of choice are likely culture-specific. This research suggests that the well-known positive effects of choice for individuals can be accompanied by an array of previously unexamined and potentially negative outcomes for other people and for society.
Published May 13, 2011
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/05/11/0956797611407928.abstract
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
Cristina Bicchieri cb36@sas.upenn.edu
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Erte Xiao
Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Ryan Muldoon
University of Western Ontario, Canada
Abstract
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics January 31, 2011 1470594X10387260, first published on January 31, 2011 doi:10.1177/1470594X10387260
Cristina Bicchieri cb36@sas.upenn.edu
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Erte Xiao
Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Ryan Muldoon
University of Western Ontario, Canada
Abstract
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics January 31, 2011 1470594X10387260, first published on January 31, 2011 doi:10.1177/1470594X10387260
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